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Long-Run Returns to Education
Does Schooling Lead to an Extended Old
Age?
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A B S T R A C T
While there is no doubt that health is strongly correlated with education,
whether schooling exerts a causal impact on health is not firmly estab-
lished. We exploit a Dutch compulsory schooling law to estimate the
causal effect of education on mortality. The reform provides a powerful in-
strument, significantly raising years of schooling, which, in turn, has a sig-
nificant and robust negative effect on mortality. For men surviving to age
81, an extra year of schooling is estimated to reduce the probability of dy-
ing before the age of 89 by almost three percentage points relative to a
baseline of 50 percent.
I. Introduction
Inequalities in health and life expectancy by education are striking.
In the Netherlands, individuals with a university or college degree live, on average,
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six to seven years longer than those who finished only primary school. The difference
in life expectancy in good health is as much as 16 to 19 years (CBS 2008). Such
disparities in health and mortality by education have been documented for many
countries (Grossman and Kaestner 1997; Smith and Kington 1997; Mackenbach et
al. 2008; Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2008). Yet, very few studies have found robust
evidence of a causal impact of education on health. The correlation also could stem
from childhood ill-health constraining educational attainment (Perri 1984; Behrman
and Rosenzweig 2004; Case, Fertig, and Paxson 2005) and confounding factors such
as ability and time preference (Fuchs 1982; Berger and Leigh 1989; Auld and Sidhu
2005; Deary 2008). Establishing whether education causally impacts on health is
essential to the formation and evaluation of education and health policies.
The purpose of this paper is to establish whether education has a causal impact
on mortality in old age using exogenous variation in education that comes from a
compulsory schooling law introduced in the Netherlands in 1928. This reform, which
increased the educational attainment of the population suddenly and strongly, pro-
vides a valuable instrument within a regression discontinuity design. We directly
observe deaths in a very large sample of individuals tracked between the ages of 81
and 89. This makes it possible to investigate whether there are long-run health
returns to education that accumulate and result in an extended life.
Lleras-Muney (2005; 2006), exploiting changes in compulsory schooling and child
labor laws in more than 30 U.S. states, estimates that an additional year of schooling
reduces the ten-year probability of dying by at least 3.6 percentage points. This
analysis is based on only an approximation to mortality derived from the change in
cohort size between subsequent censuses and Mazumder (2008) demonstrates that
the magnitude and the significance of the effect are not robust to allowing mortality
trends around the affected cohorts to differ across states possibly due to differences
in public health measures. Clark and Royer (2010), who measure mortality somewhat
more directly than Lleras-Muney (2005), find that the 1947 and 1972 extensions to
the school leaving age in the United Kingdom had strong impacts on educational
attainment, but no significant effects on mortality. Albouy and Lequien (2009) ex-
ploit two compulsory schooling reforms in France in 1923 and 1953. They do not
find a significant effect of education on mortality, which is observed directly from
micro data, possibly because the reforms did not have very strong impacts on years
of schooling.
While the weight of existing evidence does not support an effect of education on
mortality (Mazumder 2008; Albouy and Lequien 2009; Clark and Royer 2010), some
(but not all) studies using compulsory schooling laws as a source of exogenous
variation in education find an effect on self reported health outcomes (Spasojevic
2003; Oreopoulos 2006; Mazumder 2008; Silles 2009) and hospitalizations (Arendt
2008). An obvious weakness of evidence based on self-reported health is that re-
porting thresholds may vary with education (Bago d’Uva, O’Donnell, and Van
Doorslaer 2008). If this is the case, the resulting bias would not be corrected by
instrumenting education.1
1. If individuals with more schooling tend to understate their health, as some of the evidence suggests
(Bago d’Uva, O’Donnell, and Van Doorslaer 2008), then the impact of education on health will be under-
estimated.
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The main weakness of most of the analyses of mortality, with the notable excep-
tion of Albouy and Lequien (2009), is that they rely on approximate measures of
mortality at the cohort level rather than directly observed survival at the individual
level. We observe a very large number of individuals from linked Dutch adminis-
trative and survey data for which a mortality followup is available. Given the strong
instrument, provided by the compulsory schooling reform, and tremendous power,
generated by the sample size and micro data, it is quite unlikely that we will fail to
detect an effect of education on mortality should one exist in the population.
We find that education significantly lowers mortality in old age. For men surviving
to 81, an additional year of schooling reduces the probability of dying before reach-
ing 89 by almost three percentage points, relative to a baseline probability of 50
percent. Increased education generates health returns that accumulate and are main-
tained over the long run—possibly by permanently improving health behavior, re-
ducing occupational risks, raising income or endowing ability to manage chronic
diseases—and become manifest in improved survival chances at an advanced age.
Our estimate of a 6 percent reduction in the eight-year probability of death at age
81 is not necessarily indicative of the magnitude of any effect operating at other
ages. But provided education does not reduce the probability of survival to 81, then,
within the Dutch context, we can conclude that observed differences in life expec-
tancy by education in early adulthood are, at least in part, attributable to a causal
effect of education.
A significant impact is found only with the larger of our samples, which is con-
sistent with lack of statistical power partly explaining why most previous studies
have found no evidence of a causal impact of education on mortality. The strength
of our compulsory schooling law instrument, the fact that this took effect at a rela-
tively low level of education, inducing children to enter secondary school, and the
advanced age of our sample, which ensures both that health returns to education are
fully accumulated and mortality rates are high, would also seem to be important
contributors to finding a significant effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information
on the Dutch reforms that enable us to estimate the causal impact of education on
mortality. The data and methods are discussed in Section III. The main results are
presented in Section IV. The concluding section considers explanations for discrep-
ancies between our findings and those of other studies and acknowledges limitations
of the present study.
II. Compulsory Schooling Laws in the Netherlands
The first compulsory schooling law, mandating six years of educa-
tion, was introduced in the Netherlands in 1900 (Dodde 2000). In the years before
World War I several attempts were made to increase the compulsory years of school-
ing to seven, and even eight. Due to the war, a law raising the minimum school
leaving age came into force only from January 1, 1922. The law required children
to follow primary school at least from their seventh birthday until they had com-
pleted at least seven years of schooling, or had reached the age of 14 (Hentzen 1928,
p. 4). In fact, the large majority of children started school before the age of seven
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(Idenburg 1964, p. 489). Since after 1920 entry during the year was no longer
allowed in most cases, more and more children entered school between the ages of
five and one half and six (Sterringa 1934, p. 88).
Lack of resources meant that the 1922 law was never enforced (Hentzen 1932).
In 1924, the number of years of compulsory schooling was officially reversed from
7 to 6 and the increase postponed until 1930. But an improvement in the economy
prompted the government, in response to a request from parliament, to bring the
rise forward to July 1st 1928 (Hentzen 1932; De Graaf 2000). The law had an effect
at the transition of the school year (Hentzen 1932, p. 185) and so came fully into
effect for all schools only at the start of the new school year (CBS 1931, p. 19;
Mandemakers 1996, p. 55), which was August/September in cities and March/April
in the countryside (CBS 1931, p. 36). Consequently, the law was only universally
enforced from the year 1929 onward (CBS 1931, p. 19; Mandemakers 1996, p. 55).
On 24 June 1929 (Staatsblad 1929), the law was rephrased to clarify that children
attending a school with only six grades had to complete a seventh year at another
school (Hentzen 1932, p. 206; Sterringa 1934, p. 96). Before that date, some parents
registered their child at a six-grade school to circumvent the seventh compulsory
year of schooling (Gielen 1984, p. 124). Because most primary schools had only six
grades, the reform induced—as we will show later—a large proportion of pupils to
enter and complete secondary school.
Individuals born in 1916, who started school at age six, or younger, would have
fulfilled their schooling obligations under the old regime before the new law was
enforced (Sterringa 1934, p. 113). This cohort was not affected by the reform. In-
dividuals born in 1917 were at most 11 on July 1, 1928, and could not have met
the conditions to leave school under the pre-1928 legal regime. The cohort born in
1917 was the first to be affected by the 1928 reform and to be forced to complete
seven, rather than six, years of schooling. Therefore, we put the reform threshold at
a birth date of January 1, 1917.2
Compulsory schooling was raised further to eight years in 1942 under the German
occupation with the aim of promoting the German language. A lack of competent
teachers and materials, and resistance from the population, meant that both the qual-
ity of the extra education and compliance with the law were very low (Meijsen
1976; HSG 1946/1947).3 After the war, a new law confirmed the increase in the
minimum years of schooling to eight, but deferred its enforcement to January 1,
1950 given high rates of school absence and the unpopularity of the war-time in-
crease, circumvention of which had become almost a heroic deed (HTK 1946/1947).4
We have confirmed that the 1950 reform did induce some individuals to obtain more
2. It is possible that some individuals born in 1916 who started school at age seven were affected by the
reform, and some individuals born in 1917 who started school at age 5 were allowed to drop out. But
these cases are plausibly small fractions of the total. We do not observe place of birth and so cannot
distinguish between rural and urban residents who started school in April and September respectively. It
is not therefore possible to determine the reform threshold with 100 percent accuracy for every observation.
But this is not vital in a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) since the only requirement is that
the probability of receiving treatment jumps discontinuously at the threshold, which, as we will show later,
is obviously the case in our application.
3. HSG refers to notes of both the Lower House (House of Representatives) and the Upper House (Senate)
4. HTK refers to notes of the Lower House (House of Representatives)
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schooling, but the effect is not large and so does not provide a strong instrument
for education. Later increases in the minimum school leaving age in 1969, 1975,
and 1985 also do not provide clear first-stage discontinuities and given the very low
mortality rates observed in individuals below the age of 40, it is likely that even the
large sample available for this study would be insufficient to detect small effects. In
the analysis we restrict attention to the 1928 reform, which, as will become apparent,
had a strong impact on educational attainment.
III. Data and Methods
A. Data
Our data are linked survey and administrative records from Statistics Netherlands.
We use the annual cross-sectional general household survey (POLS) 1997–2005, the
tax records (RIO) for 1998, and the Cause-of-Death register for 1998 until 2005
inclusive. All these files are linked to the Dutch Municipality Register (GBA), which
covers, among others, date of birth, sex, province, and ethnicity.
The POLS samples a representative cross-section of the noninstitutionalized Dutch
population ranging from around 10,000 to 80,000 respondents per year.5 It collects
extensive information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The re-
spondent’s education is recorded by two variables: the highest level followed and
that finished on the standard Dutch categorization [Standaard Onderwijs Indeling
(SOI) 1998].6 The SOI is very close to the International Classification of Education
(ISCED) and is easily converted into years of schooling following standard guide-
lines (SHARE 2007).7 In the relatively few cases that individuals reported to have
followed a higher level than they finished, we take the average of the corresponding
years.8 Through linkage with the Cause-of-Death register we are able to observe
death and its cause for all POLS respondents who died between 1998 and 2005.
The RIO is a huge administrative tax-register covering one third of the Dutch
population, around five million observations per year. Apart from detailed income
information, it also contains demographics. By linking the RIO tax records to the
Cause-of-Death register we observe, again, mortality for all individuals. Unfortu-
nately, education information is not available in the RIO, but, as will be explained
below, it is still possible to combine estimates from the linked RIO-death register
5. Specifically 34,439 in 1997, 80,789 in 1998, 42,605 in 1999, 37,482 in 2000, 24,231 in 2001, 22,259
in 2002, 25,163 in 2003, 21,706 in 2004, and 10,378 in 2005.
6. SOI is missing in the 2003 wave of the POLS. However, there is a highly similar educational variable
available in that year, which is redefined into SOI and ISCED.
7. The Dutch SOI consists of seven levels of education: toddler school, primary education (six years),
lower vocational secondary education (ten years), higher general secondary education (13 years, similar to
high school), first phase higher education (15 years, intermediary vocational education), second phase
higher education (16 years, higher vocational education) and third phase higher education (17 years, uni-
versity education).
8. We drop 385 individuals who reported having followed a lower level than the one they report finishing,
or who claimed to have followed a level to which they do not have access given their highest level
completed.
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with those from the POLS to obtain instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the
impact of education on mortality.
The CBS Linked Data are unique in the context of data that have been used
previously to estimate the impact of education on health in the sense that they
provide a mortality followup of both a sample survey (POLS, 1997–2005) and a
very large administrative database (RIO, 1998). So, individual mortality is observed,
and with the POLS we observe both education and mortality for the same sample
observations. The mortality record provides eight years of followup by cause of
death. Given that the cohorts affected by the reform we study were born after 1916,
we observe these individuals in their 80s9 and cannot estimate any impact that edu-
cation has on survival to 81.10 We estimate the effect of years of schooling on the
probability of dying between 81 and 88 (inclusive), conditional on being alive at
age 81. If education raises the probability of survival to 81, then this presample
selective mortality will downwardly bias our estimate of the impact on the condi-
tional probability. Low-educated individuals who manage to survive to 81 must be
atypically robust in their health relative to the population of low-educated individuals
in the same birth cohort. Highly educated individuals surviving to 81 do so, assuming
there is an education effect, in part, because of, rather than in spite of, their edu-
cation.11 Consequently, highly educated survivors will not have such strong inherent
health as their low-educated counterparts. Any positive effect of education on sur-
vival beyond 81 will have to overcome these unobservable health differences be-
tween low and highly educated survivors to 81 and so the estimate of the causal
effect will be biased downward. Note that the bias will not be corrected by our IV
estimator—the unobservable differences would exist in the surviving sample even
if education were allocated randomly. But, if education does indeed raise the prob-
ability of survival to 81, then at least we know that we will identify a lower bound
on the true causal effect of education on mortality between 81 and 89.
B. Identification Strategy and Estimation
We exploit the 1928 compulsory schooling law as an instrument for education within
the framework of a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) (Thistlethwaite and
Campbell 1960; Trochim 1984; Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001; Lee and
Card 2008; Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Van der Klaauw 2008; Lee and Lemieux
2010). All analyses are done separately for males and females. Year of birth (cohort)
determines whether the individual is exposed to the reform, so sorting around the
threshold is absent. Furthermore, not all individuals exposed to the reform are in-
9. An estimated 25 percent of Dutch males born in 1917 and 49 percent of females is still alive at age 81
and, for this cohort, life expectancy at birth was around 60 for males and 68 for females [Human Mortality
Database, University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(Germany) www.mortality.org].
10. Physical censuses have been abolished in the Netherlands since 1991, with 1971 being the last available
one. In 2001, there was a “virtual” census based on administrative data. The absence of recent, comparable
census data makes it difficult to estimate cohort mortality rates indirectly and to use these to estimate the
impact of education on survival to age 81.
11. The issue is akin to that of conditional on positives analysis discussed by Angrist and Pischke (2009,
p.99)
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duced by it to change their education. We therefore have a discrete running-variable
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity setup (Lee and Card 2008) and the appropriate es-
timator is parametric Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), in which years of education
is instrumented by the reform. Under the standard assumptions of RDD (Hahn, Todd,
and Van der Klaauw 2001; Van der Klaauw 2002), this provides an estimate of the
Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of an additional year of education on mor-
tality for individuals in the first cohort exposed to the reform that were induced to
stay at school.
In the first stage, using the POLS survey data, we regress years of education on
an indicator of whether the individual is exposed to the reform (1 for 1917 birth-
year cohort and later), a flexible polynomial in cohort, and wave dummies.12 The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)13 (Black, Galdo, and Smith 2007) and Lee and
Card’s (2008) G-test14 of the flexibility and goodness-of-fit of the polynomials in-
dicate linear and quadratic specifications that allow the cohort trend to differ on
either side of the threshold are sufficiently flexible and we present results for these
models.15 We allow for nonrandom specification error in the polynomial by com-
puting robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level (Lee and Card 2008). A
reduced form linear probability model of the binary mortality variable is estimated
with the same specification as in the first stage.
A drawback of the POLS survey data, which are used to obtain 2SLS estimates,
is the potential lack of power for an outcome such as mortality. With around five
million observations, this is not a problem with the tax register RIO data. The
absence of education from this data set is not a problem since in the exactly identified
case the coefficient of interest in 2SLS estimation can be written as the ratio of two
reduced form coefficients, which can be estimated using separate samples from the
same population (Angrist and Krueger 1992; Arellano and Meghir 1992; Inoue and
Solon 2010). The standard error of this Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares
(TS2SLS) estimator is obtained by the delta method (Devereux and Hart 2010).
12. Wave dummies are entered in the analysis of the POLS data only to correct for differential mortality
probabilities within the observation period across the cross-sections. That is, someone observed in the 1997
POLS is more likely to have died by 2005 than someone in the 2004 POLS. Since the wave dummies are
included in the mortality regression, they are also included in the years of schooling regression.
13. The AIC is twice the difference between the number of parameters of a model and the value of the
log likelihood function at the optimum (Akaike 1974). The model with the lowest value provides the best
balance between fit and parsimony.
14. The G-test is computed as where is the restricted error sum of
(ESS ESS )/(JK)R URG ESSRESS /(NJ)UR
squares of estimating a polynomial through the cohort averages, while is the unrestricted error sumESSUR
of squares of regressing the outcomes on a full set of cohort dummy variables. Further, J is the number
of cohorts, K is the number of parameters estimated in the restricted model and N is the number of
observations. The values of the G-statistic should be compared to an F (J-K, N-J) distribution, where
significantly high values of the G-statistic indicate that the polynomial is not sufficiently flexible.
15. Eight models with different degrees of flexibility of the polynomial were compared—linear, quadratic,
cubic, and quartic in cohort with and without interactions with the reform dummy. Models with interactions
are more consistent with the spirit of RDD (Lee and Lemieux 2009) and place no restrictions on the
conditional mean function (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
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Table 1
Naı¨ve OLS estimates of the Probability of Death on Years of Education
Males (N3,650)
Years of education 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cohort NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES
Females (N5,513)
Years of education 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cohort NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES
Notes: Naı¨ve OLS estimates of the effect of years of education on the probability of dying between 1998
and 2005 of cohorts born between 1912 and 1922. Data are from the 1997–2005 POLS. Cohort refers to
a quartic polynomial in cohort. Covariates include wave dummies, marital status, province, city size and
ethnicity. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. * p-value0.1, ** p-value0.05, *** p-value
0.01
IV. Results
A. Naı¨ve OLS Estimates
Table 1 gives naı¨ve OLS estimates of the impact of an additional year of schooling
on the probability of dying in the 1998–2005 period for cohorts born between 1912
and 1922. For males, the reduction in the probability of dying is 1.5 percentage
points per additional year of schooling, and this falls to 1.1 points but still remains
strongly significant when both a cohort trend (quartic polynomial) and covariates
(marital status, ethnicity, province, and city size) are controlled for. For females,
there is also a significant but slightly smaller effect of 0.8–0.9 percentage points.
There is clearly a negative association between education and mortality in this popu-
lation. Our aim is to establish whether the correlation has a causal element.
First-stage Estimates
Figures 1a (males) and 1b (females) show years of education completed by year-of-
birth cohort, along with the fitted regression line from the quadratic (in cohort)
specification, which has the lowest AIC value, and the predicted counterfactual out-
come from this model. For males, there is a very clear and large discontinuity in
educational attainment at the first cohort that is fully affected by the 1928 reform—
the 1917 birth-year cohort. The average years of schooling increases by more than
0.8 at the threshold. This impact was noticed by Statistics Netherlands way back in
1931, stating that “the strong increase in children attending school in 1929 can
largely be explained by the increase in compulsory schooling” (CBS 1931, p. 19).
Contemporary authors continue to believe the reform was responsible for a substan-
tial increase in post-primary schooling (Mandemakers 1996, p. 52–53). The level
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Figure 1a
Years of education by cohort. 1912–22 birth-year cohorts, males
Figure 1b
Years of education by cohort. 1912–22 birth-year cohorts, females
Data are from the 1997–2005 POLS. Fitted line is from a quadratic in cohort with the trend allowed to
differ on either side of the reform threshold (as in the right-hand column of Table 2—lowest AIC value).
and the trend of education across cohorts are very different for females. From a
lower level, there is a steep drop in years of schooling between 1913 and 1915. The
reason for this is not evident. The decline is subsequently reversed but with no sign
of any discontinuity in the upward trend at the 1917 cohort. This suggests that the
1928 reform did not have a strong impact on the schooling of females and does not
provide a useful instrument. The lack of female compliance was observed by Sta-
tistics Netherlands in 1931, commenting that: “For boys apparently secondary edu-
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Figure 2
Years of education by month-of-birth. Last six months of 1916 and first six months
of 1917, males
cation was considered more necessary than for girls” (CBS 1931, p. 50). Given this,
we do not pursue the estimation of a causal effect for women.
Figure 2, which shows, for males, years of schooling by month of birth for the
last six months of 1916 and the first six months of 1917, confirms a discontinuity
at January 1917, supporting the choice of this date for the reform threshold. Note
that estimating the treatment effect using month-of-birth data is not feasible due to
the small cell sizes at that level, particularly for the older cohorts. We do, however,
check robustness in Section 4.5 to using six monthly and quarterly data.
The first-stage OLS estimates presented in Table 2 indicate that the 1928 reform
raised the average years of schooling of males by between seven months and one
year depending on whether the cohort trends are specified as linear or quadratic.
The reform indicator is strongly statistically significant in both models, which is
confirmed by the extremely strong robust F-tests of the instrument, passing all cri-
teria proposed in the literature (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock
1997; Stock and Yogo 2002).16 The G-tests indicate that both models are sufficiently
flexible and we have confirmed robustness to alternative specifications of the cohort
trends, with the coefficient on the reform indicator always significant and lying in
the range of 0.6–1.
16. The Stock and Yogo critical values (Stock and Yogo 2005) can only give approximate confirmation
of the strength of the instruments since they are computed for an iid error model and here we have made
the F-tests robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the cohort level. Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman
(2007) suggest relying on the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb that the (robust) F-statistic should
exceed ten for weak instruments not to be considered a problem. This is satisfied for all models.
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Table 2
First-stage estimates of Years of Education on the Compulsory Schooling Law
(N3,650).
Variable Linear Quadratic
Reform 0.636*** 1.039***
(0.112) (0.050)
Cohort 0.039 0.241***
Cohort2 0.049***
Reform*cohort 0.032 0.121**
Reform*cohort2 0.073***
Wave98 0.242 0.244
Wave99 0.19 0.194
Wave00 0.661** 0.661**
Wave01 0.128 0.125
Wave02 0.099 0.106
Wave03 0.323 0.328
Wave04 0.737** 0.734**
Wave05 0.167 0.165
Constant 9.743*** 9.443***
AIC 19,566.66 19,565.42
F-statistic 32.21 436.08
G-statistic 0.16 0.02
Notes: OLS estimates controlling for cohort trend and wave dummies. Estimations pertain to cohorts 1912–
22, for males. Data are from the 1997–2005 POLS. “Reform” is 1 if 1917 cohort or later. The “Cohort”
variable is centered on the 1917 cohort. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. F-statistic is for test of
significance of “reform,” and is robust to clustering at cohort level and heteroskedasticity. G-statistic is the
test statistic of the flexibility of the cohort polynomial, which follows a F(J-K,N-J) distribution, where J
is the number of cohorts used in the estimation, K is the number of parameters, and N is the number of
observations (Lee and Card 2008). Standard errors (in parenthesis for “Reform”) are robust to heteroske-
dasticity and clustering at the cohort level. * p-value0.1, ** p-value0.05, *** p-value0.01
C. Reduced Form Estimates
For male cohorts born between 1912 and 1922 present in the pooled POLS samples
from 1997 to 2005, there is a small downward discontinuity at the 1917 threshold
in the probability of dying before the end of 2005 (Figure 3). The respective reduced
form estimate of the effect of the reform on mortality is negative in both models
presented in Table 3, but the effect is not significant. Insignificance could simply be
due to a lack of power, which is not a problem with the much larger RIO sample.
Given the much larger RIO sample, it is not surprising that the trend in the
probability of dying in the 1998–2005 period (Figure 4) is smoother than in the
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Figure 3
Proportion of the pooled 1997–2005 POLS sample that died before the end of
2005, by cohort
Fitted line is from a quadratic in cohort with the trend allowed to differ on either side of the reform
threshold (as in the third column of Table 3—lowest AIC value). Cohorts 1912–1922, males.
corresponding graph produced from the POLS data (Figure 3).17 Although the dis-
continuity at the reform threshold seems small, there is a small downward shift in
the (linear) trend at that point. The corresponding reduced form estimates presented
in the right-hand panel of Table 3 confirm that the 1928 reform induced changes
that reduced the probability of dying before the age of 89 for individuals surviving
to 81 by 2–3 percentage points, an effect that is strongly significant.
D. (Two Sample) Two Stage Least Squares Estimates
Irrespective of the specification, the 2SLS point estimate of the effect of years of
education on mortality is negative and close to 0.03 in magnitude but is not signifi-
cant (Table 4). The TS2SLS estimates, generated using the larger RIO sample, in-
dicate that, for individuals surviving to age 81, an additional year of schooling
significantly reduces the probability of dying before reaching 89 by just less than
three percentage points.18 Given that around 50 percent of males with six years of
schooling, corresponding to primary school completion, died between the ages of
17. Note that the average mortality rate in the 1998 RIO is higher than in the POLS data, which is due
to the fact that the POLS data samples a new cross-section of survivors every year between 1998 and
2005.
18. Note that this is not strictly comparable with the 2SLS estimate using the 1997–2005 POLS, which
gives the probability of surviving to 89 for individuals still alive at some age between 80 and 87. The
scope for making the estimates directly comparable is limited by a sample size of only 833 individuals in
the relevant age range from the 1998 POLS. As would be expected, performing 2SLS on this sample does
not produce precise estimates.
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Table 3
Reduced Form estimates of the Probability of Death on the Compulsory Schooling
Law.
Variable Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Pooled POLS 1997–2005 samples (observed at
ages 80–87). N3,650
RIO 1998 sample (observed at
age 81). N66,891
Reform 0.020 0.029 0.018*** 0.029***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.005) (0.004)
Cohort 0.020*** 0.005 0.032*** 0.018***
Cohort2 0.003 0.002**
Reform*Cohort 0.013** 0.036 0.007*** 0.027***
Reform*Cohort2 0.001 0.001*
Wave98 0.055** 0.055**
Wave99 0.092*** 0.092***
Wave00 0.148*** 0.148***
Wave01 0.224*** 0.224***
Wave02 0.307*** 0.307***
Wave03 0.403*** 0.404***
Wave04 0.453*** 0.453***
Wave05 0.563*** 0.563***
Constant 0.675*** 0.692*** 0.640*** 0.655***
AIC 4,829.1 4,828.8 92,274.5 92,275.6
G-Statistic 0.36 0.33 0.60 0.25
Notes: Reduced Form OLS estimates of the impact of the 1928 Compulsory Schooling Law on the prob-
ability of dying before the age of 89 for individuals surviving to at least 80. Estimations pertain to cohorts
1912–22, for males. “Reform” is 1 if 1917 cohort or later. AIC and G-test as in Table 2. Standard errors
(in parenthesis for “Reform”) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the cohort level. * p-value
0.1, ** p-value0.05, *** p-value0.01
81 and 88, our estimates suggest that one extra year of schooling reduced the prob-
ability of dying by 6 percent.
E. Robustness and Placebo Tests
In this section we test the robustness of our estimates to choices made at different
stages of the analysis and also perform placebo tests. We begin with the choice of
bandwidth around the reform threshold (see for example Lee and Lemieux 2010).
Identification relies on the treatment being as good as randomly assigned near the
threshold, and this will only hold if the cohorts are sufficiently close to each other.
Yet, focusing attention on just a few cohorts around the threshold reduces power.
The base case uses five birth-year cohorts before and after the reform to estimate a
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Figure 4
Eight-year mortality rate—proportion of the 1998 RIO sample that died before
then end of 2005, by cohort
Fitted line is from a linear in cohort with the trend allowed to differ on either side of the reform threshold
(as in the fourth column of Table 3—lowest AIC value). Cohorts 1912–22, males
Table 4
Regression Discontinuity estimates of the Probability of Death on Years of
Education.
Variable Linear Quadratic
2SLS estimates from 1997–2005 POLS (observed at ages 80–87).
(N3,650)
Years of education 0.031 0.028
(0.027) (0.025)
TS2SLS estimates from 1997–2005 POLS (N3,650) and RIO 1998
followup (observed at age 81). (N66,891)
Years of education 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.004)
Notes: Regression Discontinuity Design estimates of the impact of a year of education on the probability
of dying before the age of 89 for individuals surviving to at least 80. Estimations pertain to cohorts 1912–
22, for males. Both the POLS and RIO data are linked to the Cause-of-Death Register (DO). Years of
Education is instrumented by the 1928 compulsory schooling reform. “Linear” and “Quadratic” as in Table
2 for 2SLS and as this without wave dummies for TS2SLS. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the cohort level and are obtained by the Delta method for the TS2SLS
estimation. * p-value0.1, ** p-value0.05, *** p-value0.01
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reliable cohort trend.19 The estimation is repeated using ten and three cohorts on
either side of the 1917 threshold (Table 5). Using ten cohorts brings the first-stage
coefficient from the quadratic specification closer to that of the linear model, which
increases somewhat.20 The reform indicator is still highly significant, with the F-
tests (not shown) showing no evidence of a weak instrument. Raising the bandwidth
to ten cohorts increases the reduced form estimate somewhat for the linear model,
yet decreases it for the quadratic specification. In both cases, the effect remains
significant. As a result of the changes in the first-stage and the reduced form esti-
mates, using a bandwidth of ten cohorts has little impact on the magnitude and
significance of the TS2SLS estimate with the quadratic specification, but the estimate
increases from 2.7 percentage points to 4.8 points, and remains highly significant,
with the linear specification. Reducing the bandwidth to three cohorts has some
impact on the first-stage and reduced form point estimates. These changes have very
little impact on the TS2SLS estimate using the linear specification, but in the qua-
dratic model an additional year of education is estimated to reduce the probability
of death by only 1.2 points compared with an effect of 2.6 in the base case. The
magnitude of the effect is therefore somewhat sensitive to the choice of bandwidth,
with the range of estimates increasing to 1.2–4.8 points. But the effect remains
strongly significant in all cases.
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that all of the difference in
mortality between the cohort immediately before the reform and the one immediately
after the reform is attributable to the difference in education. This is more plausible
when the time separating those two cohorts is less. Comparability between individ-
uals born in the second half (last quarter) of 1916 and those born in the first half
(first quarter) of 1917 should be greater than that between those born in all of 1916
and those born in 1917. However, in our case, using half-yearly or quarterly cohorts
does not allow a more accurate definition of the threshold, and it increases variability
since the cohort sizes get much smaller. For these reasons, we use birth-year cohorts
in the base analysis and check robustness to higher frequency analysis. When doing
so, we take account of possible season-of-birth effects (Doblhammer and Vaupel
2001; Doblhammer 2002) by including dummies for quarter-of-birth.
The first-stage estimates are very robust to replacing birth-year with half-year and
quarter-of-birth cohorts (Table 5). As would be expected given the fall in cell sizes,
significance of the reduced form estimates is reduced, but maintained at 5 percent
in three out of four cases, while the point estimates change little. As a result, the
TS2SLS point estimates are relatively robust, falling in magnitude from around a
19. Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) suggest a data dependent bandwidth choice rule, according to which
the optimal bandwidth in the first stage is 4.31, which is very close to our chosen bandwidth of 5 and
within the range of this and the smallest bandwidth used in the robustness analysis. Estimates using 4
cohorts on both sides of the threshold (not presented) are also extremely close to those obtained with 5
cohorts. The Imbens and Kalyanaraman rule indicates an optimal bandwidth of 1.6 in the reduced form
but we have used 5 cohorts in the base case analysis since the same authors advise using the same
bandwidth at both stages
20. Using a wider bandwidth may threaten the assumption of observations on either side of the threshold
being equivalent. Robustness of the results to controlling for ethnicity, as well as three covariates deter-
mined after education—marital status, province and city size—that could potentially be endogenous, pro-
vides some indication that this is not a problem.
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three percentage point reduction in the probability of death with an extra year of
schooling to a two point reduction. When quarter-of-birth cohorts are used, and so
the cell sizes become very small, significance rises just above the 10 percent thresh-
old (p0.103 for the linear model, and p0.133 for the quadratic).
TS2SLS is consistent under the assumption that the two samples are drawn from
the same underlying population (Angrist and Krueger 1992; Arellano and Meghir
1992). This is not strictly true in our case since the first stage is estimated using the
pooled POLS cross-section samples of the 1997–2005 populations, while the second
stage is estimated using the RIO one-third sample of the 1998 population followed
to 2005.21 Consistency of the TS2SLS estimator would be threatened if the impact
of the reform on the education of the 1998 population differed from its effect in the
other populations from which samples are drawn for the first stage. A test of the
joint significance of a full set of reform-wave interactions in the first stage with
1998 as the reference rejects the null in both specifications, suggesting that the effect
does indeed vary. Yet, individually, only the effect in the 1999 sample is significantly
different from that in the 1998 sample, and only at the 10 percent level. Moreover,
using only the 1998 POLS to estimate the first-stage changes the point estimates of
the reform effect relatively little (Table 5). The standard errors increase greatly,
which is to be expected given the sample size falls from 3,650 to 833, but signifi-
cance is maintained at 10 percent or less. The TS2SLS estimates are robust to using
1998 data only in the first stage. The point estimates are in the range of 2.3–3.1
points and are significant at 5 percent.
While the statistical power provided by the RIO sample size is clearly an advan-
tage, one might worry that this is responsible for detecting an effect that is apparent
but not real. To investigate this we test ten placebo reforms—five on each side of
the actual reform. Keeping pre and post actual reform samples separate and using a
five-year bandwidth to ensure comparability with our base scenario (Imbens 2004;
Imbens and Lemieux 2008), we place artificial thresholds at each cohort from 1908
to 1912, and at each cohort from 1922 to 1926. Five of the 20 tests conducted across
the two reported specifications reject the null of no effect of the placebo reform
(Table 6, Columns 1 and 2), which is obviously in excess of the one rejection at the
5 percent level of significance that would be expected to occur by chance. However,
significance of a placebo only ever occurs with one of the two specifications and
the point estimate from the other specification typically differs greatly. For no pla-
cebo reform is there any indication of the strongly significant and consistently es-
timated effects of the 1928 reform observed in the bottom half of Table 3. Signifi-
cance of the fictitious reforms could be due to fluctuations caused, for example, by
the business cycle. This is unlikely for the highest possible frequency for our running
variable—quarter-of-birth. None of the 20 placebo tests performed at this frequency
rejects the null (Table 6, Columns 3 and 4), in contrast to the actual reform which
is consistently estimated and statistically significant when treatment is defined by
quarter of birth (Table 5). This gives us confidence that the significant effects are
21. Individuals who died or were institutionalized subsequent to 1998 but prior to 2006 are not part of
the population from which the POLS is sampled in one or more years between 1999 and 2005. Individuals
who died between 1997 and 1998 were available for the POLS 1997 sample used in the first stage but not
the 1998 RIO sample used in the second stage.
712 The Journal of Human Resources
Table 6
Placebo tests—Reduced Form estimates of the Probability of Death on Fictitious
Reforms.
Year-of-Birth cohorts Quarter-of-Birth cohorts
Variable Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Cohorts 1903–13. N13,107
Placebo 0.005 0.033** 0.000 0.014
Reform 1908 (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.034)
Cohorts 1904–14. N16,676
Placebo 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.014
Reform 1909 (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Cohorts 1905–15. N20,616
Placebo 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.000
Reform 1910 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018)
Cohorts 1906–16. N25,079
Placebo 0.004 0.032*** 0.008 0.034
Reform 1911 (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.021)
Cohorts 1907–16. N24,555
Placebo 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.018
Reform 1912 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.021)
Cohorts 1917–27. N114,129
Placebo 0.009*** 0.002 0.005 0.003
Reform 1922 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Cohorts 1918–28. N124,318
Placebo 0.010** 0.001 0.007 0.007
Reform 1923 (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Cohorts 1919–29. N118,395
Placebo 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004
Reform 1924 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008)
Cohorts 1920–30. N145,177
Placebo 0.005 0.004** 0.008 0.002
Reform 1925 (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007)
Cohorts 1921–31. N154,057
Placebo 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.008
Reform 1926 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Notes: OLS estimates on RIO 1998 data with mortality followup, for males. “Placebo Reform” refers to
the artificial reform at the birth-year cohort indicated. Columns 1 and 2 are based on yearly cohorts;
Columns 3 and 4 are based on quarter-of-birth cohorts. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p-value
0.1, ** p-value0.05, *** p-value0.01
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not simply attributable to the large sample size, but rather reflect a real effect of
education expansion at the threshold.
V. Discussion
A compulsory schooling law introduced in the Netherlands in 1928
increased the schooling of Dutch males by 0.6–1.0 years, on average. Using this as
a strong and exogenous instrument for educational attainment, along with directly
observed mortality data on a random one-third of the population, we find that edu-
cation significantly reduces mortality in old age. For a Dutch male surviving to the
age of 81, an additional year of schooling reduces the probability that he will die
before reaching 89 by slightly less than three percentage points relative to a baseline
probability of 50 percent. This suggests that the well-documented large correlation
between education and health outcomes is not spurious but stems (at least partly)
from a causal effect of education on health, and consequently longevity.
This conclusion is consistent with that of Lleras-Muney (2005), who finds that
increased schooling resulting from education reforms introduced in the United States
between 1915 and 1939 reduced mortality significantly. Although the different ages
of the samples impedes comparability, our estimate of an extra year of schooling
reducing the probability of death over an eight-year period from the age of 81 by
slightly less than 6 percent is perhaps more plausible than Lleras-Muney’s (2005;
2006) tenfold larger IV estimate of about 60 percent for cohorts aged 35–69. The
magnitude and significance of the latter estimate have been found not robust to
controlling for state specific cohort trends that may capture the effects of mortality-
reducing public health measures coincident with compulsory schooling laws (Ma-
zumder 2008). Our estimate is identified from a discrete and marked jump in school-
ing due to a nationally implemented reform that is less likely to have coincided with
some other factor responsible for shifting mortality from its trend over the ten-year
period examined.
Albouy and Lequien (2009) and Clark and Royer (2010) also use a regression
discontinuity approach to exploit the variation in schooling generated by compulsory
schooling laws and find no evidence of a causal effect of education on mortality.
The first of these negative results may be attributable to weakness of the French
education reform, which, unlike the Dutch reform exploited in the present paper,
did not have a marked impact on schooling. This cannot explain the discrepancy
between our finding and that of Clark and Royer, who do get substantial independent
variation in schooling from the 1947 and 1972 British education reforms. Differences
in the ages of the samples and in the nature of the education reforms could explain
the discrepancy. Clark and Royer attempt to estimate the impact of the 1947 and
1972 British reforms on the probability of death between the ages of 45 and 69, and
20 and 44, respectively. The baseline probabilities in these age intervals are only 20
and 2.4 percent. Not only does the low incidence reduce the likelihood to detect
sizable effects (Clark and Royer 2010, p. 20), at younger ages it is also unlikely
that any health disadvantage to low education, possibly operating though lifelong
exposure to unhealthy behavior, occupational risks or low income, has fully mate-
rialized such that the effect, if it exists, may be modest. This is in sharp contrast to
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Figure 5
Proportion finishing high school by cohort. Data are from the 1997–2005 POLS
Fitted line is from a quadratic in cohort with the trend allowed to differ on either side of the reform
threshold. Cohorts 1912–22, males
our study of individuals between the ages of 81 and 89 facing a mortality rate of
50 percent.
The British reforms examined by Clark and Royer raised the minimum age at
which a child was permitted to leave secondary school from 14 to 15 in 1947 and
from 15 to 16 in 1972. These corresponded to increases in the number of years of
compulsory schooling to 10 and 11 respectively. The 1928 Dutch reform exploited
in the present paper took effect at a much lower base level of education, raising the
compulsory years of schooling from six to seven. Diminishing health returns to
education may partly account for the different findings of the two studies. A priori
diminishing returns is a plausible hypothesis—one might expect large health returns
to basic reading and writing skills that should be most crucial to the processing of
health related information. Lleras-Muney (2005) finds evidence of a convex rela-
tionship between mortality and education instrumented by compulsory schooling
laws.22 Auld and Sidhu (2005) show that the association between health, measured
by work limitations, and schooling in the United States diminishes beyond high
school level and find evidence of a causal effect only before high school graduation.
Returns to the 1928 Dutch reform may be particularly high not only because it
compelled an extra year of schooling at a relatively low level but because it induced
a change in the nature of the education experienced. Since primary school in the
Netherlands consists of 6 years, the reform required entry to secondary school. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the rate of secondary school completion increased by more than
22. Lleras-Muney (2005) warns against giving too much credence to these estimates since IV only can
identify nonlinearity for those affected by the compulsory laws instruments, located in the region of low
education.
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ten percentage points for the first cohort affected by the reform. It would appear that
the reform was successful not only in forcing children to start secondary school but
also induced many to complete this level. Secondary schooling exposed children to
a new curriculum and a different group of peers. In contrast, the British education
reforms studied by Clark and Royer extended the length of compulsory secondary
schooling and, to some extent, can be characterized as entailing more of the same.
The 1947 reform involved no change of curriculum and, given that it affected 50
percent of the cohort, did not result in large changes in peer group exposure. Al-
though monetary returns to this reform have been clearly demonstrated (Oreopoulos
2006; Clark and Royer 2010), it could well be that its nature precluded the generation
of substantial health returns.
Given that year-of-birth is a relatively coarse running variable in an RDD, one
might worry that other events occurred around the threshold that may have had long-
run consequences for the health and mortality of cohorts born at that time. The
robustness of our estimates to using half-year and quarter-of-birth cohorts makes it
less likely that factors other than the 1928 education reform are responsible for the
decline in mortality. Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether there are plausible
alternative explanations. The 1917 cohort was born during World War I. Despite
being neutral in the war, the Netherlands was affected by it—most notably through
the reduced supply of food (Abbenhuis 2006, pp. 187–194). But the war lasted from
1914 to 1918 and there seems little reason to expect its long-run health consequences
to differ much between those born in 1916 and those born in 1917.
Using a unique historical data set, Van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Portrait (2006)
find that individuals born during a recession in the Netherlands in the 19th century
faced higher mortality risks than those born during an economic boom. The effect
is largest between the ages of 15 and 34 but it remains significant even up to the
age of 90. Although our data covered a later period, this study suggests that one
should check for abrupt changes in macroeconomic conditions around the threshold.
The Dutch economy grew rapidly 1914–16, stagnated 1916–17 and grew even more
rapidly between 1918 and 1920.23 According to the estimates of Van den Berg,
Lindeboom, and Portrait, the recession between 1916 and 1917 should have raised
mortality around the threshold. The discrete fall observed in mortality at this point,
evident even in quarter-of-birth comparisons, does not therefore appear attributable
to changing macroeconomic conditions. Another major health event in this period
was the 1918 “Spanish Flu” Pandemic. Almond (2006) finds that, in the United
States, individuals who were in utero at the time of the pandemic experienced higher
rates of physical disability, as well as lower socioeconomic status, in their middle
age. In the Netherlands, the pandemic struck in the autumn of 1918, almost two
years after our January 1917 threshold. If there are long-run consequences for health,
then this would tend to raise mortality in our post-reform cohorts. This is inconsistent
with what we observe and so not a plausible alternative explanation of our results.
23. Net National Product in each year between 1914 and 1920 in millions of Euro was as follows: 1,239
(1914), 1,464 (1915), 1,675 (1916), 1,664 (1917), 1,860 (1918), 2,509 (1919), and 2,852 (1920). Source:
Statistics Netherlands http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VWT&DMSLNL&PA7343nr&
D10-8&D20&D3a&HD080827-1126&HDRT,G1&STBG2.
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Figure 6
Eight-year mortality rate-proportion of the 1998 RIO sample that died in the
period 1998–2005, by cohort
Fitted line is from a linear in cohort with the trend allowed to differ on either side of the reform threshold.
Cohorts 1912–22, females.
Because these and other events might be expected to impact equally on women
and men, examination of the trend in female mortality over the relevant cohorts can
be used to gauge whether extraneous events provide a plausible explanation for the
observed decline in male mortality at the threshold. As can be seen in Figure 6,
there is no discontinuity in female mortality at the 1917 cohort (the reduced form
point estimate is 0.001 with standard error of 0.003). Given that we also find no
significant impact of the reform on the schooling of females, this further increases
the likelihood that the observed fall in mortality among men is due to their increased
educational attainment, rather than some coincidental other factor.
Our IV estimates of the impact of schooling on mortality are larger than those
obtained assuming schooling to be exogenous.24 Instrumenting is frequently found
to raise the estimated impact of education on earnings (for example, Card 1999) and
this has also been observed in estimates of the health returns to education (Arkes
2003; Arendt 2005; Lleras-Muney 2005; Oreopoulos 2006; Silles 2009). Measure-
ment error is a possible explanation but heterogeneity in the returns to education is
a more convincing one. RDD IV identifies the LATE among compliers at the thresh-
old of the 1928 reform (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001; Van der Klaauw
2002; Imbens and Lemieux 2008), which may differ considerably from the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) that OLS seeks to estimate. This interpretation
implies that health returns are highest among those who would not have stayed on
24. OLS estimates based upon just the 1998 sample are extremely close to the ones using the full sample
(0.011 vs. 0.014 using full controls, results available upon request), such that sampling issues are not
causing the discrepancy between OLS and (TS)2SLS estimates.
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at school had the minimum years of schooling not been increased. This is not par-
adoxical once it is recognized that, relative to monetary returns, health returns are
unlikely to play an important role in the decision to stay on at school. Further,
particularly in the 1920s, individuals facing the greatest credit constraints may well
have had higher than average potential returns—both monetary and nonmonetary—
to education. Diminishing returns to education also may contribute to the discrepancy
between the naı¨ve OLS and IV estimates. Using parental education as instruments,
which mainly induce changes in post-high school education, Auld and Sidhu (2005)
find IV estimates of health returns smaller than naı¨ve OLS estimates. This contrasts
with what is found when compulsory schooling laws are used as instruments, which
provides variation around a lower level of education (Arendt 2005; Lleras-Muney
2005; Oreopoulos 2006; Silles 2009).
Two broad hypotheses have been advanced to explain an impact of education on
health. According to the first, education raises the productivity of investments in
health, including medical care, through information acquisition and processing skills
(Grossman 1972). This is perhaps less relevant in the context of universal health
insurance and limited inequality in access to medical care in the Netherlands (Van
Doorslaer, Masseria, and Koolman 2006). The second hypothesis is that education
operates through health behavior (Muurinen 1982). Empirical studies confirm that
the lower educated indulge in less healthy behavior (Feinstein et al. 2006; Cutler
and Lleras-Muney 2008) and that lifestyle acts as a mediator between education and
health (Contoyannis and Jones 2004; Balia and Jones 2008). The cohorts studied in
this paper were 42–52 when the U.S. Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and
Health was published in 1964. U.S. studies report that the better educated were more
likely to quit smoking, or not take it up, after the publication of evidence on its
risks (De Walque 2007; Grimard and Parent 2007). Although most smoking-related
deaths occur before the age of 80, Peto et al. (1992) estimate that 39 percent of
deaths of Dutch males in 1995 above the age of 70 were smoking-related. We
investigated whether there was any evidence of a mechanism through smoking be-
havior by comparing the estimated treatment effects of education on different causes
of death. While we did find a significant effect on deaths from respiratory diseases
and on all deaths categorized as smoking attributable mortality (U.S. Department of
Health and Social Service 1989; Peto et al. 1992), there was no consistent evidence
of a larger effect on these than on other causes of death (results available upon
request).
A distinguishing feature of our study is that we estimate the impact of schooling
on mortality for individuals aged above 81. This allows us to test whether there are
very long-run nonmonetary returns to education but it also means that we miss any
impact that education may have on the probability of survival to old age. If education
raises this probability, then our estimate of a 6 percent reduction in the eight-year
mortality rate will understate the impact of education on mortality in old age since
low-educated survivors, having overcome their education-related disadvantage, will
have an advantage over their highly education comparators in health determinants
that are not related to education. So, the long-run health returns to education may
be even greater than we estimate.
Use of our results should be made bearing in mind that they are generated from
a 1928 reform that increased compulsory schooling from six to seven years. The
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estimated longevity returns may be more indicative of those to be expected from
education policies being enacted, or considered, in the developing world today than
they are of returns to rich world policies. That said, our estimates suggest that
evolution of longevity of the elderly populations in developed countries, which is
of fundamental importance to the design of pension and health policy, will depend
on education experiences in early life many decades ago.
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